This paper examines an overlapping generations version of the Shapley-Shubik market game. We show existence of equilibria for the simple one commodity model and analyze the dynamics of the equilibrium trajectories generated in the model.
I. Introduction
Most economic historians date the start of business cycles as an important economic phenomenon in the West to the on-set of industrialization in Europe at the end of the 18th century (see, e.g. Rostow [1978] or Schumpeter [1939] ). The usual reasons cited for this coincidence are the scale economies associated with new production technologies, and the lags inherent in the technical innovation and capital accumulation processes. Scale economies are important in enlarging the geographic extent of the markets served by individual factories. This magnification of the market, in turn, magnifies the importance of lags in the process of refining and building new technological infrastructure. The end result, so this argument runs, is a pronounced change in the nature of the stochastic response of the economy to shocks, and the emergence of the phenomenon of business cycles.
Industrialization had other important consequences, however, beyond the direct enlargement of markets in response to scale economies. One of the more important effects was the reorganization of industry forced by scale economies, and the emergence of oligopoly in manufacturing. A second, related effect was the concentration of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs pushing the industrialization process. These two effects, taken together, changed the way that business was done by magnifying the importance of strategic interactions among firms relative to the previous norms of competitive behavior.
In this paper, we examine the question of whether strategic interactions contribute to the instabilities which characterize business cycles. There are a number of reasons to suspect, a priori that imperfectly competitive markets might play a role in generating business cycles. First, expectations play a major role in determining adjustment dynamics in models of imperfect competition. Peck and Shell [1991] , for example, have shown in the context of a Shapley-Shubik [1976 , 1977 market game (see also Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1978] ) that the strategic behavior of agents in this model make sunspot and correlated equilibria possible. It is also wellknown (see, for example, Mas-Colell [1982] ) that strategic interactions in an economic model can result in the introduction of significant non-linearities in the pricing of commodities as agents in the model make adjustments in their own net trades in response to the actions of other agents. It is also well-known that non-linearity can be an important source of complex dynamics in intertemporal economic models.
The Shapley-Shubik market game model is particularly attractive here, since it allows one to model the thickness of the market and thus be able to study the link between market liquidity and economic instability and welfare. Market thickness determines how big an impact each agent's bid for the good has on determining the overall price. In general, the thicker the market (i.e. the more of the good put up for sale), the smaller the effect of a change in bid on the price. This has two consequences. First, thick market equilibria can be Pareto superior to thin market equilibria.
Second, thick market equilibria are less susceptible to endogenous fluctuations. Finally, the model also allows us to separate the strategic effects of market thickness from that of variations in the value of money, which are the source of fluctuations in competitive overlapping generations (OLG) economies.
In other related work, Rotemberg and Woodford [1993] argue that imperfect competition is a necessary outcome in an otherwise conventional real business cycle model if there are internal increasing returns to scale in production. Results by Benhabib and Farmer [1992] and Gali [1992] in the RBC context show that increasing returns can lead to the existence of sunspot equilibria. These models go a step further than that of Peck and Shell by examining market dynamics in the presence of imperfectly competitive agents, but, because these papers involve models of production it isn't clear whether strategic behavior by agents, or the increasing returns technology is responsible for the sunspot results.
In our analysis, we examine a one commodity overlapping generations version of the Shapley-Shubik market game. Forges and Peck [1995] examine a similar model but with a large number of small agents, using the market game framework to model the price formation process in competitive OLG economies. We focus our analysis on the role of strategic interactions in generating complicated dynamics, and examine a model of pure exchange between small numbers of agents. This formulation also allows us to make systematic comparisons between our model and that considered by Grandmont [1985] , which examines the dynamics of the OLG model under the assumption of perfect competition. The outcomes of a Walrasian OLG model can be realized as a limit of the equilibria of the market game.
The key result we show is that unlike in Grandmont [1985] the pervasiveness of complex dynamics depends on market thickness and not on preference parameters. While we will undertake a more detailed comparison of our results with those of Grandmont below, we note that for complex or chaotic dynamics to occur in Grandmont's model, old agents must be highly risk averse. With CRR additively time-separable preferences, Grandmont finds that relative risk aversion coefficients on the order of 8-9 are necessary. In contrast, we find for the market game with identical agents, endowment assumptions together with market thinness is sufficient to generate complicated dynamics, regardless of the specification of preferences. We believe the endowment assumptions are more realistic than Grandmont's preference assumptions, since we require only that endowments when old or retired are low enough, a reasonable assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and basic notation. Section 3 develops the dynamic analysis and presents the results of simulations.
II. The Model
We consider a simple Shapley-Shubik market game model of pure exchange with overlapping generations of agents. Time is discrete, with periods numbered t=0,1,.... In every period, there are n > 0 young agents born, each of whom lives for two periods. Since we will also be making comparisons of the results from this model with those obtained by Grandmont [1985] , we will assume that each agent born after period 1 is identical to others in the same generation and those in other generations. In period 1, there are n > 0 old agents alive who live through the first period only. (Since most of our analysis will focus on steady-state or related stationary equilibria, we will generally ignore the initial old generation.) Thus, we have the standard overlapping generations structure in which a new two-period-lived generation is born every period and overlaps with the previous generation for one period. In each period, agents may trade a single perishable good and money, which can be stored from one period to the next. Agents are endowed with exogenously given amounts of the good in each period of life. We assume these endowments are stationary, and denote a typical young agent's lifetime endowment as [ ]
The consumption of a typical young agent born at time t will be denoted [ ]
Lifetime preferences for consumption are specified by a utility function u R R : + → 2 which satisfies the following assumptions:
Assumption P1: The utility function u is C r r , ≥ 2 , strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions.
As in Grandmont [1985] we make the additional assumption that preferences satisfy and . In addition to bidding for goods, agents may also save through the use of fiat money.
We denote the savings of an agent born in period t by m t . This agent's strategy set is then
.
0 ω
Given bids and offers, the trading process is as follows. Each agent is allocated a share of the aggregate offer of the good in the proportion that his bid bears to the aggregate bid. Each agent is allocated a share of the aggregate amount of (inside) money bid in the proportion that his offer of the good bears to the aggregate offer. Formally, we let denote the aggregate bids and offers of agents born in period t in periods t and t+1 respectively. 
A similar calculation using the second period budget constraint yields 
III. Equilibrium Dynamics
For this part of our analysis, we make the following assumption:
Assumption O1: All of the exogenously-given offers are independent of time, i.e. This assumption, together with the assumption of identical agents, stationarity of population, money supply, and endowments allows us to use the first-order conditions (2.6) to characterize the equilibrium dynamics. Note that this will be true even if otherwise identical agents make different offers, because of the equality
The first step toward such a characterization is to convert the % B state variables into a form depending only on $ B . The first-order conditions will then implicitly define a difference equation in the $ B variables. This transformation is made using the budget constraints. (For notational convenience here, we suppress temporal as well as agent specific subscripts.) Since
Substituting this expression into the first-order conditions (2.6) and manipulating then yields We note that when n>1, the aggregate other-bid variables that agents are assumed to take as given in choosing their own bids are, owing to the assumption that agents are identical, functions of their own bids. However, because no agent has control over any of the bids of his cloned cousins in the market, the Nash equilibrium concept requires that he take this (identical) bid as given. is a sequence of interior Nash equilibrium prices for the n-fold replication of the market game. Since offers are fixed, the aggregate offer necessarily goes to infinity as n does. Aggregate bids must, therefore, also diverge since otherwise, we have p t n → 0 , which affords young agents unbounded first-period consumption and hence is not compatible with equilibrium. Examining the terms in square brackets in (3.1), we find that 
It is apparent from these calculations that in the limit, we obtain the equations governing the law of motion for the perfectly competitive economy. Hence, we have the following Proposition 3.1 The Nash equilibrium for the n-fold replication of the type economy converges to the competitive equilibrium as n → ∞.
Given this result, we are justified in viewing the model as a generalization of Grandmont's [1985] model.
In using (3.1) to characterize the equilibrium dynamics of the model, it is useful to make the following change of variables (similar to that used by Grandmont 
The first-order characterization of the steady-state equilibrium in the transformed model is
Define a function
, . Any interior $ θ for which ( ) h $ θ = 0 will constitute an interior steady-state equilibrium. To show that the function h has a zero, note that
since the MRS at the endowments is less than 1. Note next that ( ) The first-order characterization of the steady-state in the transformed model is
This expression can be obtained from the original model by noting that in the classical case, optimal money holdings will be negative, and that goods will be transferred from the old to the young, so that in the transformed model, we define
Again defining a function h as
since the MRS at the endowment is assumed to be bigger than 1. Also,
so there exists an interior steady-state in this case as well.q
As a corollary to this result, we show next that there are a continuum of steady-state equilibria coresponding to the different levels of the exogenously specified offers, and that these equilibria can be Pareto ranked, so that the indeterminacy of the steady-state equilibrium associated with different levels of market thickness is real. Note also that since the level of savings is fixed exogenously, there is an indeterminacy in the "value of money" which corresponds to the nominal indeterminacy one finds in the Walrasian OLG model. We will show the results for the Samuelson case (the proof for the classical case is analogous).
Assumption E2:
Corollary 3.3 The steady-state equilibrium $ θ is a non-trivial function of the aggregate offer Q.
Proof: This result is a simple application of the implicit function theorem. From the first-order conditions, we know that $ θ satisfies
Differentiating this expression with respect to $ θ yields
Since we know there is at least one steady-state equilibrium, the implicit function theorem implies that $ θ is a C 1 function of the offer variable(s) on a neighborhood of that (and hence any) steady-
it will then follow that ( ) $ θ Q will be non-trivial. But this inequality must be strict since it is impossible to change Q without changing either $ Q or ~.
Q q
We can now show that the steady-state equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
Corollary 3.4 Assume E2 holds. Then the steady-state equilibrium depends non-trivially on the market thickness and thick markets are Parato superior to thin markets.
Proof:
The first-order conditions evaluated at the steady-state are
From the previous result, we know that locally, $ θ is a decreasing function of Q. We can, in fact,
show more: as the size of the aggregate offer Q gets small, the associated steady-state value of $ θ must go to zero. The assumption that $ θ remains positive implies that the first term of the firstorder condition is positive. Hence for the first-order condition to hold, the second term must be negative, which occurs if and only if $θ < Q . Since Q approaches zero, Q approaches zero and hence $ θ goes to zero. Now, the lifetime utility associated with the steady-state is
The change in utility associated with a perturbation of Q is given by
The first-order condition (3.2), however, implies that
Thus, the marginal utility associated with changes in the steady-state equilibrium is strictly positive. Since we know that $ θ is decreasing in Q, it follows that utility decreases as the market gets thin.q
These results demonstrate clearly that there are fundamental differences between competitive and strategic OLG economies, and in particular, that market thickness matters. In the Samuelson case, for example, we know that money improves efficiency because money enables young agents to save. However, in the offer-constrained market game, there is a restriction on the amount of the good offered for sale. As the amount of the good offered for sale goes to zero, young agents are able to save less and less in real terms, thus reducing efficiency.
In the limit, the allocations converge to the autarky allocations. Thus agents prefer thick markets. This phenomenon occurs, of course, because the game is non-cooperative, so there is no way for any individual agent to increase the offers of other agents. The agent's own offer is optimal in the sense that any change in the offer can also be acheived by a corresponding change in the bid, owing to the indeterminacy of bids and offers in the model.
Hence, the next step in our analysis is to examine the the effects of variations in market thickness on the equilibrium dynamics of the market game. Following Grandmont, we focus on the backward dynamics of the model. There are several reasons for doing this. First, when the parameter settings of the model are such that cyclic perfect foresight equilibria exist, the forward dynamics of the model are actually characterized by a correspondence while the backward dynamics can be characterized by a function. This occurs for the same reason it does in Grandmont's model: the offer curve is "backward-bending". In this situation, if the backward dynamics exhibit cycles which are stable under iterations of the dynamics, these cycles will also be perfect foresight equilibria under the forward dynamics of the model. Furthermore, backward stable cycles are necessarily unstable under the forward dynamics, and hence constitute determinate rational expectations equilibria. A second reason for focusing on the backward dynamics comes from the literature on learning rational expectations. There are a number of papers (see, e.g., Marcet and Sargent [1989] , or Woodford [1990] ) which examine how agents in a dynamic economy might go about learning the rational expectations equilibrium of that economy using statistical methods to generate forecasts based on past data. As Grandmont showed (for the case of adaptive expectations), if such forecasting schemes are consistent with rational expectations (in the sense that repeated observations of REE prices generate forecasts of those prices), and satisfy certain additional assumptions on the convergence of the forecasting scheme on periodic data, then the question of which REE the model converges to reduces to that of which equilibria are stable under the backward dynamics of the model. More recently, Kelly [1992] has shown in the context of a model with least-squares learning that if the equilibrium is stable under the backward dynamics of the model, this equilibrium will be the one that agents learn. 2 2 The model in this paper satisfies the conditions given in Kelly [1992] for the result that stability of the backward perfect foresight dynamics implies stability of the forward dynamics under least squares learning.
In studying the backward dynamics of the market game model, we write the reduced form backward dynamics as The functions ν1 and ν 2 have the following properties. First, since
and U is concave, it follows that ν 1 is positive and strictly increasing on the interval [0,ω 1 ].
A similar calculation for the function ν 2 yields (3.5b)
be the relative risk aversion of the old agent. As in Grandmont [1985] , we make the following assumption. 
, so that we know that the maximum is interior and can be characterized by the vanishing of the first derivative of ν 2 . Now
Using (3.5b), we find that
Since R 2 is positive and non-decreasing, we have β(0)>R 2 (0), while ( ) ( )
Since the function β is decreasing, the critical point θ* is unique and corresponds to the maximum we know exists. Furthermore, since ′ ν 2 is continuous, condition ( ) * * holds.q
The graph in Figure 1 illustrates the geometry of this result.
Figure 1
Since the function ν 1 is increasing, it follows from this proposition that the map ϕ also has a unique critical point at θ*.
Proposition 3.2 showed that for any offer constrained market game where endowments are not Pareto optimal, these exists a steady-state equilibrium. We show below that this equilibrium is unique in a given offer constrained game. With these results in hand, we can now show conditions under which there will exist an equilibrium cycle of order 2. Cyclic equilibria of order 2 are significant because their existence implies the existence of sunspot equilibria. These can be either of the second-order Markovian variety first examined by Azariadis [1981] , which uses the cyclic equilibrium to construct the sunspot equilibrium, or of the "bootstrap" variety examined by Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [1990] , which uses the forward stability of the steady-state dynamics to construct local sunspot equilibria around the steady-state.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1 and 3.2, it is well-known that a sufficient condition for existence of a cycle of period 2 is that ( ) ′ < − ϕ θ $ 1 , i.e. the monetary steady-state is unstable in the backward dynamics. For this condition to obtain in the market games model requires (using the derivatives calculated in 3.5a and 3.5b) that 
At the steady-state equilibrium, the first-order conditions imply that
so that, on substituting and simplifying, we get the condition
Note that as Q → ∞ this condition reduces to the corresponding condition for the competitive model (see Grandmont [1985] , expression 4.10).
We now strengthen assumption E2.
We can now show the following.
Proposition 3.7. Assume that U and V satisfy E1, E2, P1,P2,P3, and O1. Then under E3, there exists a Q such that condition (3.6) holds.
Proof: From the first-order conditions, we know that at the steady-state,
From this expression, it is apparent that as ~,
Then, taking limits on both sides above, we find
Now, an orbit of period 2 will exist for sufficiently small
Under assumption E3, δ > Q Q In the context of the original formulation of the market game, this problem manifests itself through the fact that if all offers go to zero, the equilibrium bids of agents become indeterminate.
If at least one agent has positive offers, however, the aggregate equilibrium bid diverges, and the equilibrium remains well defined in the limit. In the type economy with n>1, it is important to realize that the proposition still holds for small values of Q , if $ Q is chosen such that equation (3.7a) and the inequality of the proposition hold. Whether or not such a $ Q exists depends primarily on n. With n=1, such a $ Q exists, for n sufficiently large, no such $ Q exists.
We now wish to apply Sarkovskii's theorem (see, for example, Guckenheimer and Holmes [1983] for a discussion of this result) on the relationship between periodic orbits of a dynamic system, and show conditions under which the map ϕ will have an orbit of period 3. By
Sarkovskii's theorem, ϕ will then have orbits of all periodicities.
To show this result, we apply the results of Grandmont's [1985] To show condition 1, we need to strengthen Assumption E3 slightly.
Assumption E4:
( ) ( )
With this assumption, we can now show the following.
Lemma 3.8. Assume ν1 and ν2 are such that E1, P1,P2,P3, and O1 hold. Then under Assumption E4, there exists Q such that
Since this must hold for all positive % Q , dividing by % Q and rearranging yields
Taking limits, we see that From the construction used to prove this result, it is also clear that the complex orbits of ϕ will emerge as Q gets small, i.e. as the market gets thin.
At this point, we need to return to the question of whether the bids associated with the complex orbits ever become negative. With the assumptions imposed to this point, we are guaranteed that θ ≥ 0 . Since θ is just the real money balances m/p, θ ≥ 0 implies that the price will always be non-negative, and hence that the bids of a young agent will necessarily be bounded below by −m , since offers are required to be positive. Thus, for the young agent's bid to be negative requires that q t 1 < θ . This tells us immediately that if n=1, all bids are strictly positive, since in that case Q q = 1 and, under our maintained assumptions, we know that θ t Q <~. When n>1, it may occur that q1<θt and the bid of the representative young agent becomes negative. However, as long as θt satisfies the assumptions of Propositions 3.6 and 3.8, the constraint that lifetime bids be non-negative are satisfied (repeating the above exercise for b t t+1 implies that b t t+1 is bounded from below by m ). 
The key thing to notice here is that this inequality can only be valid for
ω since preferences are not defined for negative consumption. Since Q Q q = + 2 and q 2 2 ≤ ω , Q1 is finite.
Another question is whether complex dynamics remain if we add agents in a way which does not thicken the market. Suppose we replicate the economy by adding agents, but simultaneously reducing individual offers such that Q remains unchanged, in essence keeping the market thin.
In this case the parameters~$ Q Q and are defined, in terms of the underlying values of q1 and q2 bỹ
Hence, inverting these relations gives ( ) ( )
From the expression above, we see that for q1 to remain positive as n gets large requires that
For q2 to remain positive, on the other hand, requires that
These two conditions clearly cannot hold simultaneously in the limit, though they may hold for some values of n (and, as we noted above, hold automatically for n=1). Intuitively, the process of adjusting individual offers in order to keep ~$ Q Q and constant can eventually require that some individual offer become negative, which is not permissable. However if the above conditions are satisfied and offers are positive, the economy will replicate. Prices will remain positive since although individual bids and offers are shrinking, aggregate bids and offers remain positive and finite. It is, therefore, the thinness of the market, not the number of agents, which determines if complex dynamics persist.
We conclude from this that the two potential routes to chaos --thin markets and high second-period risk aversion --are independent. Our results for the market game show that market thinness can, independently of preferences, lead to complicated dynamics, though these effects will disappear in the competitive limit unless other, preference-based assumptions restore them.
To complete this section, we note that while the existence of an orbit of period 3 implies the existence of orbits of all periodicities, the cycles one is likely to observe under iterations of the backward dynamics (or suitably adapted forward learning schemes), depends on which particular orbits are stable, and, of course, the domains of attractions for the stable orbits. Grandmont [1985] uses the negative Schwarzian derivative condition to show the existence of a unique strongly stable orbit for the competitive model with CRR preferences when the relative risk aversion of young agents is less than one, and that of old agents greater than two. When such an orbit exists, all points in the domain of the mapping, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero are in the domain of attraction of the strongly stable orbit. The condition also makes it particularly easy to calculate bifurcation diagrams for the model, since it is known for such orbits that the critical point of the mapping is attracted to this orbit.
In the market game model, demonstrating the Schwarzian derivative condition is considerably more difficult, though we can show for the CRR preferences case that as Q gets small, the Schwarzian derivative of the map ϕ becomes negative. We omit the proof of this fact, however, because improvements in computing power over the past decade have made the need for analytic verification of strong stability in example economies moot. As a practical matter, one can demonstrate stability in a class of examples by simply iterating the dynamics on the computer for a grid of initial conditions. If we observe convergence to a particular orbit over all the points of the grid, it is a reasonable indication that the orbit is strongly stable. In the following section, we show from simulations that as markets become thin complex dynamics not only exist, but are stable.
IV. Simulations
In this section, we present some results from some numerical simulations of the model exhibiting complex dynamics. These results will be presented in the form of bifurcation diagrams which show how the backward stable equilibria change as we vary the market thickness This particular example can also be replicated using the technique described after example 1 for up to n=7 agents.
V. Further Research
Strategic interactions complicate economic dynamics. This much is apparent from our analysis and the simulation results. Whether these kinds of effects are important empirically in a large, modern industrial economy remains an important unanswered question. From a methodological perspective, it is also unclear whether the overlapping generations market game model is capable of answering these types of questions. In pursuing research into these issues, it would be useful to know if the inherent indeterminacy of the offers in this model can be eliminated by incorporating production in the model. One possibility which suggests itself is to endow agents with some technology for converting (say) leisure into output, while requiring that production decisions (which then translate into offers on the market) must be made prior to the opening of bidding. Some preliminary work with this kind of model suggests that production does add "smoothing" to the model in the sense that we no longer observe the kind of wild dynamics that come out of the pure exchange model. Nevertheless, cyclic behavior remains a possibility in some of the numerical examples we have looked at.
A related question concerns the role of expectations. One way of endogenizing the offer decision is to specify offers as functions of expected future prices (or bids, or bids and offers), possibly in the context of a model in which agents are trying to learn the "correct" offers. In this form, the model comes to resemble models examined in some of the macroeconomics literature (see, e.g. Cooper and Ejarque [1995] ).
Finally, it would be useful to know whether our results generalize to multigood OLG settings, and to stochastic environments. It is not difficult to show existence of equilibria in the general OLG market game by applying the proof technique of or Balasko, Cass and Shell [1980] in conjunction with the existence results for the general static market game presented in Peck, Shell and Spear [1992] . (A general existence proof along these lines is available on request from the authors.) It is also well-known, at least in competitive multigood OLG models, that the equilibrium dynamics of the general model are considerably more complicated than those of the one good model. It is also well-knwon that stochastic multigood OLG economies are even more difficult to solve, at least for generic parameterizations of the model (see, e.g. Spear [1985] ). Whether these kinds of problems are more or less tractable in the strategic setting is, as yet, unknown.
